Ethiopia is increasingly using expropriation as the single most important device to take land particularly from small landholders to supply it to corporate farmers and industrialists with a declared intention of boosting economic growth. This is happening in the context where expropriation laws are inadequate to protect peasants and pastoralists. The state is not paying cash compensation for land use rights, compensation for property on the land is paltry, and uniform rehabilitative schemes are absent. There are also no sufficient administrative and judicial mechanisms in place to restrain the government in exercising its power of expropriation. This is lax expropriation system that runs counter with the country`s Constitution which pledges tenure security for small landholders. This article recommends enhanced judicial scrutiny of expropriation, recasting land use rights as human rights, and emphasis on the quality of projects that necessitate expropriation. Ethiopia should expedite these and related measures in the interest of justice, securing the livelihoods of the masses and national stability.
Introduction
Ethiopia`s recent economic growth has generated unprecedented demands for land for urban expansion, infrastructure, manufacturing, corporate farming and mining. The state is trying to meet these rising demands through two main routes. The first is through invoking the 'empty land' narrative (i.e., unoccupied land) which, inter alia, entails the designation of communal lands as 'government owned land' in order to render use of expropriation unnecessary.
The other is use of the power of expropriation which focuses on land taking primarily from smallholders. This article focuses on the latter.
In Ethiopia, there is lack of comprehensive data on how frequently and extensively, for what purposes as well as with what impact the state is actually using its power of expropriation. This hampers an empirically grounded study of expropriation. 1 However, legal research through the analysis of Ethiopian law of expropriation, and its substantiation by various research findings and some fieldwork reveal a trend that raises concern. The trend implies a reordering of the land tenure system of Ethiopia increasingly in favor of capital. 2 This implies a remaking of the extant land tenure system which is dominated by smallholder agriculture through expropriation of land from such smallholders for 'public purpose' to lease it out to capital. This in turn suggests the beginning of a shift from a land tenure system dominated by subsistence farm holdings to a system whereby land is increasingly deployed to the service of commercial farmers and industrialists with a declared purpose of enhancing economic development. This shift contradicts state policies and laws that at the same time pledge to enhance the tenure security of small landholders through the 'land for all' narrative.
The first section considers the present state of Ethiopian expropriation law and practice in light of three basic ingredients of expropriation; namely, public purpose, compensation and legal recourse. The section also provides a brief discussion of incompatibilities between federal and regional expropriation laws, and between bilateral investment treaties and the expropriation law of the country. The second section examines the 'transformative expropriation' purportedly advanced by the Ethiopian government. That is, it presents the manner in which the state explains its expropriation law including the underlying thinking behind Ethiopia`s expropriation law. The third section considers three forms of reforming Ethiopia`s expropriation regime. These are judicial scrutiny, recasting land use rights as human rights and postexpropriation development.
These three sections are informed by the lessons that Ethiopia can draw from comparative experiences of India, Ghana and Kenya. These countries are chosen because they are predominately agrarian countries with massive smallholder population, and they have registered recent economic growth that has enhanced the demand for land which primarily comes from smallholders via expropriation. Law reforms in these jurisdictions also involve land matters including issues of eminent domain that give due emphasis to the need for adequate compensation and effective access to regular courts. 3 The overall argument of the article is that current expropriation laws are inadequate to protect small landholders because they over-privilege economic development projects. This is related with the fact that the Ethiopian state is not legally obliged during expropriation to pay compensation for land use rights nor is it obligated (or at times not feasible) to give a substitute land. It is also argued that compensation for property on the land is inadequate and that legally and institutionally backed uniform rehabilitative schemes are not built into expropriation measures. The discussion and analysis in the following sections show that legal mechanisms to harness the government in exercising its power of expropriation are insufficient. This brings Ethiopia close to countries with "high economic growth rates in which strong states, with corresponding weak rule of law, make extensive use of the power of eminent domain…" 4 3 In the case of Ghana, the Report of the Constitution Review Commission of Inquiry (2011), <www.ghana.gov.gh/images/documents/crc_report.pdf> (accessed 12 August, 2014) has devoted one chapter to land and natural resources, where the issue of adequate compensation is raised and got accepted by the Government of Ghana in its White Paper on the Report the Constitution Review Commission of Inquiry (2012), <ghanaoliwatch.org/images/Articles/crc_white_paper_report.pdf> (accessed 12 August, 2014) that also set up a Constitution Review Implementation Committee. Kenya in fact has gone ahead of Ghana in commissioning land matters, land policy formulation and adoption in 2009, setting up a constitution review commission, followed by an adoption of a revised constitution in 2010 and then enactment of three land acts in 2012. 4 Antonio Azuela and Carlos Herrera-Martin, supra note 1, p. 334.
Elements of Expropriation
The power of expropriation in Ethiopia is vested in the state by virtue of Article 40(8) of the FDRE Constitution (the Constitution) which provides that "the government may expropriate private property for public purposes subject to payment in advance of compensation commensurate to the value of the property". This article pays attention to the Expropriation Proclamation since it is the principal instrument which governs expropriation in contemporary Ethiopia. The central objective of the Expropriation Proclamation is to take land for investment activities. 6 It has three main aspects: provisions relating to public purpose, compensable property, and procedural recourses. If properly formulated and implemented, the requirements of public purpose, of compensability and of procedural recourses would have the effect of disciplining government authorities since such procedures would force the state to carefully re-examine its projects, thereby serving as a buffer zone for property holders and preventing overtaking without necessarily handcuffing such authorities. 7 Upon examination of the Expropriation Proclamation from the perspective of peasants, one observes that the law is deficient in these three counts. This section considers these three components of Ethiopia`s expropriation law in the sense of permanent physical takeover of farmland by 5 The Constitution, Article 40 (8). 6 Journal of Law and Policy, vol. 26, pp. 302-3, it is stated that there are at least four administrative costs associated with expropriation: costs relating to procedural guarantees including public hearing to determine the existence of public purpose, costs of appraising the amount of compensation, the compensation itself and costs of litigation, and these four costs would hinder governments from rampantly engaging in takings.
documenting the state of expropriation law in Ethiopia and the practice thereof with a focus on farmland expropriation. 8
Public purpose
The main aim of public purpose in connection with expropriation is to restrain the discretionary power of government authorities. Public purpose can be understood in different ways. Yet, one finds a couple of general articulations. They may be referred to as minimalist and maximalist views of public purpose.
9
The adoption of the minimalist conception precludes state authorities from undertaking expropriation to transfer the property of one person in order to enrich the patrimony of another, i.e, taking private property for solely private purpose. The test of public purpose under this view concerns itself with the question: what is done with the expropriated property? If the property taken is used to exclusively benefit private persons, then the expropriation cannot be said to have been done for a public purpose. Hence in this view, public purpose shall be interpreted to mean: "private property taken through eminent domain must provide its intended use to the public. The public must be entitled, as of right, to use and enjoy the property".
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On the other hand, the maximalist view holds that public purpose includes: 8 This Article does not consider issues of regulatory taking, which is the case where the state 'excessively' interferes with property rights in such a way that it is seen as good as physical takeover of the property itself. addressed at constitutional level confining its application to matters of public use only (e.g., many common law countries); or the constitutions might come up with a detailed list of things which are deemed to constitute public purpose or leave the matter for legislative action, in the latter category legislation might be issued that come up with a limitative precise list of matters that constitute public purpose (e.g., Japan) or the definition of public purpose might be left to the judiciary (e.g., USA). Or as the present Article shows, the concept of public purpose can be left for the discretionary of the executive branch without the possibility of judicial review (e.g., Ethiopia and China). The discussions in this subsection of the Article (Sub-section 1. …anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies and promote the productivity of any considerable number of inhabitants or a section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, contributes to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community.
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In this broad view, public purpose is conceived to include not only "uses directly beneficial to the public, such as roads, but also uses that promote the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community."
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The Expropriation Proclamation subscribes to both minimalist and maximalist approaches but for different purposes. Some articles of this expropriation legislation have been influenced by the maximalist perspective, especially when the authorities seek to expropriate land from non-investors chiefly from peasants and pastoralists. For instance, Article 2 (5) of this law defines public purpose as: the use of land defined as such by the decision of the appropriate body in conformity with urban structure plan or development plan in order to ensure the interest of the peoples to acquire direct or indirect benefits from the use of the land and to consolidate sustainable socio-economic development (emphasis supplied).
Article 3(1) of the same provides that the appropriate government authority has the power to expropriate land for the public purpose:
… where it believes that it should be used for a better development project to be carried out by public entities, private investors, cooperative societies or other organs, or where such expropriation has been decided by the appropriate higher regional or federal government organ for the same purpose.
Such legal description is as good as having none because the authorities can attach the 'public purpose' label to virtually any project of their liking. As the observations during a focus group discussion indicated:
The definition given to public interest in rural and urban land laws is extremely broad and vague. Its meaning permits to take property from one person and give it to another without the need to establish any public purpose at all. What is public interest: when a road is to be built or a factory is to be established or a restaurant to be opened, a residential villa to be constructed in place of another residential house, etc? It is not a constraining factor at all. This expansive approach to public purpose is pursued as a trend in the acquisition of urban land including farm lands in peri-urban areas.
14 The Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation, 1993, reflected this view in stating that the public interest would not be violated by the state expropriating property solely to generate money. According to the preamble, urban areas must be permitted to lease lands so that they can obtain sufficient revenues to provide much needed social facilities and infrastructure. Its successor, the Urban Lands Lease Holding Proclamation, 2002, is even more explicit about this broad notion of public purpose. It, under Article 2(7), defines public interest as: "…that which an appropriate body determines as a public interest in conformity with Master Plan or development plan in order to continuously ensure the direct or indirect usability of land by peoples and to progressively enhance urban development". This is reiterated in the Urban Planning Proclamation, 2008, which describes public purpose, in Article 2(5), as that which "continuously ensures direct or indirect utilization of land by people and thereby enhances urban development."
However, when the state expropriates land from investors, public purpose is construed restrictively to mean taking property including land held by investors under lease only for the purpose of undertaking publicly used projects. This, in legal terms, makes it more difficult to expropriate land held by an investor under lease than that held by a private person. Thus, Article 3(2) of the Expropriation Proclamation states: "…no land lease holding may be expropriated unless the lessee has failed to honor the obligations he assumed under the Lease Proclamation and Regulations or the land is required for development works to be undertaken by government." What is stated in this provision was documented during its enactment:
… in case where land under lease contract is to be expropriated, public purpose would be construed narrowly to permit land taking when government needs the land or where the investor could not honor his obligations under the lease contract because land is inextricably linked to investment.
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This differentiated understanding of public purpose is a departure from the past since previous expropriation legislation of the country understood public purpose narrowly and uniformly without distinguishing peasants from investors.
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For example, the predecessor of the Expropriation Proclamation, that is, the expropriation law issued in 2004, was enacted exclusively with intent to obtain land for government projects. Accordingly, this expropriation statute embodied a restrictive interpretation of public purpose for it conceived public purpose in terms of land taking for public works. It defined 'public works' as: the construction or installation, as appropriate for public use, of highway, power generating plant, building, airport, dam railway, fuel depot, water and sewerage telephone and electrical works and the carrying out of maintenance and improvement of these and related works and comprises civil, mechanical and electrical works.
17
This indicates that the public purpose of expropriation as envisaged in this 2004 expropriation legislation was meant to enlarge land in the public domain of the state, not to expand property in the private domain of the government and private persons as is the case in the current Expropriation Proclamation. Additionally, this restrictive interpretation of public purpose goes in line with the tradition of the Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960 (the Code) and laws enacted by the Derg.
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Some regional rural land laws include provisions that incorporate the narrower rendition of public purpose. This is witnessed for example, by using such expressions as 'public uses' and "public common service obtained from infrastructure such as school, health, road, water, etc" and by further stipulating that land users shall lose their holdings only for public use understood in this narrow sense. 
Compensation
There are good reasons to require the state to compensate for expropriation. The time honored principle that no one including the state shall be permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of another is one reason. If the state were not required to compensate private property holders for taking their property, people would be unlikely to invest their time, labor, energy and resources in developing and improving their property and investors would be discouraged from investing in the country. Both would adversely affect economic development. That is another justification. Finally, the constitutionally enshrined requirement to pay compensation prevents wanton, destructive and arbitrary taking of private property. Compensation during expropriation should ideally aim at putting affected people into the position they would have been had the expropriation not been undertaken. It should not worsen their situation through undercompensation, nor should it enrich them through over-compensation. Those are the basic parameters in measuring the amount of compensation.
Of late, researchers have generally questioned the adequacy of compensation being paid to affected people in Ethiopia. only 18,000 Birr for the two hectares of land. This money was insignificant and I could not buy food for three years with this money. My family has been displaced and we are now leading a devastated life. 22 And, as a focus group discussion revealed, "Compensation is low for … rural land expropriation. It is much less than the loss incurred by affected people; the amount being paid worsens people`s existing situation instead of making it up for the losses they incurred due to the expropriation". 23 Generally, the condition is not any better in urban context. Evidence shows that, … the money paid as compensation to replace a demolished house is short of the necessary sum. It could not replace any standard house as per the requirements of the city regulations. The prices of materials and labor, the two most important components of valuation calculation, are not frequently updated in a way that reflects the existing market and inflation rates. The depreciation allowance deducted from the estimated value takes away more than half of the sum.
24
A recent directive issued by the Addis Ababa City Administration clearly shows the insufficiency of compensation during expropriation. 25 Several aspects of the expropriation law contribute to the insufficiency of compensation. The issues that need some discussion in this section are: compensable interests, basis of reckoning displacement compensation, substitute land, normative contradiction and lack of uniformity, the concept of a landholder, and implementation matters including lack of rehabilitation scheme.
a) Compensable interests:
In the Ethiopian context, the loss of any property right including that of land use rights is, in principle said to be compensable upon expropriation. 26 However, the Constitution is both broad and narrow in respect of the determination of compensable property. It is broad because a joint reading of sub-articles 2 and 8 22 Ibid. appears to be allowing compensation to the extent of labor or capital value added to lawfully possessed land that has been expropriated but not for the economic value of use rights over the land.
The Expropriation Proclamation has the Constitution`s approach in providing for the manner in which people affected by land taking might get compensated for the property on the land, not for the land itself. Thus, pursuant to this legislation, compensable interests are: utility lines, 28 permanent improvements to land, 29 property situated on the land which can be removed and relocated, property which can be removed for consumption (e.g. standing crops) and property which cannot be relocated (e.g., a house).
30
This expropriation law does not consider loss of land use rights due to expropriation as compensable unless the administration is able and willing to give land in the form of displacement compensation to the affected person. In other words, the law in question does not view the taking of land from a landholder as an expropriation. 31 Thus, no compensation is payable (perhaps excepting displacement compensation) if, for example, the state requires land held by a landholder, and there is no property on or improvements to such land. This is because no expropriation is considered as having been undertaken in respect of such land. The expropriation law in question assumes that the State is merely retaking public land in this case, not taking private property, which is conceived as taking labor-related tangible immovable property belonging to the landholder situated on the land.
Even in cases where there is property on land subject to taking, compensation relates to the property, not to the land per se. It is stated that, Compensation is given only to fixtures on land and land has no economic value to the holder upon expropriation. Land`s value is zero. Land`s economic value is fully captured by the state. The Constitution says land is the joint property of the state and the people. If land is really a joint property, 27 The Constitution, Article 40 (2, 3 & 7). 28 The Expropriation Proclamation, Article 2 (7). 29 Id., Article 7(1). 30 Ibid.
31 See the use of the phrase, "shall be given compensation proportionate to the development he has made on the land and the property acquired..." in the Expropriation Proclamation, Article 7(3) (emphasis supplied).
it means your right as a landholder is short of ownership including the right to reap the economic value of your land use rights. But the expropriation law does not permit you to capture enhanced value of land. Yet, the individual shall be allowed to share the enhanced value of the land instead of being diverted to state treasury as a whole.
32
The rule that there shall be no monetary compensation where there is no property to be removed from the land at the time of expropriation invited objection and criticism during the enactment of Ethiopia`s present Federal rural land law. In connection with which, it was stated that:
The right to use rural land would be made secure not by merely issuing land certificate but by fully protecting the rights of peasants as provided for in the Constitution. Complaints among peasants indicate that like what happened during the Derg period, there is an increasing tendency to evict farmers from their lands in the name of promoting the interest of the people without payment of commensurate compensation.
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The idea of not treating use rights over land as having economic value upon expropriation has nevertheless found its way into the current rural land law of Ethiopia. Courts have also subscribed to it. The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has decided that:
…the earth and rock related materials are natural resources and as natural resources are owned by the people and state, the people and state may use these resources without any payment. Therefore, even if the respondent has obtained from the relevant regional authority lease right to extract sand and gravel, as sand is a natural resource,… he cannot have ownership over sand, and … the respondent is entitled to claim for the price of extracting the sand but not for the price of the sand itself since such claim has no legal basis. The decision of the lower court that awards the price of the sand in the form of compensation is hereby reversed. It should be noted that such interpretations in this rulings of the Federal Supreme Court's Cassation Division are legally binding on all levels of federal and regional courts in the country. 35 Various rulings of the Supreme Court essentially uphold that land use rights of a landholder do not have a transferrable economic value in the context of people`s ownership of land in today`s Ethiopia.
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The narrow conception of compensable interests goes beyond and above counting out economic value of land use rights. There is a related idea of cost replacement approach which is embodied in the Expropriation Proclamation. Article 7(2) of the Proclamation stipulates that the "amount of compensation for property situated on the expropriated land shall be determined on the basis of replacement cost of the property". The application of the approach excludes legitimate interests. It has been correctly pointed out as follows:
Even though it is possible to reach market value through the use of replacement cost approach, the Ethiopian replacement cost approach is defective as compared to the international practice. It does not at all give market value for the displaced people. For example, it does not consider the value of … the location on which the building rests ... it [also] disregards all incidental and consequential damages, such as additional cost incurred as a result of change in location, reduction in market value for property leftover after partial expropriation, lost income because of delay in expropriation process, and business closure as a result of public construction works. 37 causing an interruption of current and of future income therefrom. Nor do projects compensate for quarry land and indirect expropriation brought about by particles from quarry sites that cause damage to adjacent farmlands and crops. 38 Moreover, the cost replacement method suffers from lack of clarity. Even though the method pledges to entitle replacement cost upon expropriation, it does not provide clear answers to questions such as: what does replacement cost mean? Does it exclude depreciation? Does it mean the amount paid to a person whose house is taken must enable her/him to construct a similar type of house? The challenges are further exacerbated because authorities require a person who lost a house, say, made of mud, to build a house at a standard that may require corrugated sheets, steel, cement and stone even if the amount paid as compensation renders such inputs unaffordable. The issue as to who bears this additional cost if the person is financially unable to do so 39 was among the questions raised during a focus group discussion.
Ethiopia should draw lessons from Ghana's good practices in this regard. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992) provides that "[t]he various claims for which an expropriated owner may be compensated are: market value of the land taken; or replacement value of the land taken; and cost of disturbance; and other damage (severance and injurious affection)''. 40 Kenya follows a similar normative approach.
b) Reckoning displacement compensation:
The rules on displacement compensation evoke concerns. If a rural landholder's land is expropriated permanently and where substitute farm land is unavailable, the displacement compensation is equivalent to ten times the average annual income that was secured during the five years preceding the expropriation of the land. 42 In case of a rural landholder whose land has been expropriated provisionally and substitute farmland is unavailable, displacement compensation for lost income shall be paid until the repossession of such land, which shall be based on the average annual income secured during the five years preceding the expropriation of the land 43 provided, however, that such payment shall not exceed ten times the average annual income the rural smallholder had secured during the five years preceding the expropriation of the land. 44 The displacement compensation to be paid to rural landholders who have lost their land either 38 Interview with a practicing lawyer, Southern Regional State, September 25, 2012. 39 Summary of Focus Group Discussion, supra note 13. 40 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992) . 41 The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya (2010) 42 Article 8 (1) of the Expropriation Proclamation. 43 Such displacement compensation should in the first place be the average annual income of such provisionally taken property times the number of years for which the property is taken. permanently or provisionally shall only be equivalent to the average annual income secured during the five years preceding the expropriation of the land where a substitute land is available. 45 These rules of displacement compensation have shortcomings. First, these provisions are arbitrary in selecting the ten year criterion if, during expropriation, small landholders lose their land use rights for an indefinite period of time. The same can be said regarding the five-year threshold as basis of calculating compensation. 'Five years' or 'ten years' appear to be magic numbers that do not offer valid justification. Second, the selection of five years as a factor in reckoning compensation is backward looking. In doing so, it counts against landholders because it does not take present and future inflation into account.
c) Substitute land:
Another factor that contributes to inadequate compensation in today`s Ethiopia relates to the impracticality of providing in kind compensation in the form of land because of land scarcity. As rightly observed, " [d] ue to acute land scarcity in highland areas where most land expropriations would take place, a comparable substitute land is not feasible, which means resort to payment of meager amount of compensation, which would not support the future livelihood of the victim of government taking". 47 This is in spite of the fact that the law envisages the possibility of providing a substitute land to peasants who lost their land under expropriation where there is land available and that it is perhaps a popular kind of compensation. It is remarked that "… households who are evicted are farmers who face difficulty in starting a new livelihood if they do not get another piece of land to farm because this is the only skill they have". 48 Even where a substitute land is available, the meaning of the terms 'comparable', 'fertility', 'location' and 'size' that accompany the notion are not clarified. effect, Regions have failed to pass directives that clarify these components of a substitute land.
d) Contradiction and lack of uniformity:
One of the sources of lack of uniform treatment is lack of detailed regional laws on compensation:
Regions do not have detailed law on expropriation. Where there is a gap, the regions act arbitrarily. For example, Amhara Region pays compensation for naturally standing trees on land subject to compensation but Oromia Region does not pay compensation in this case as they think that the property on the land must be the result of capital or labor.
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Besides, there is conflict between federal and regional laws regarding public purpose and the approaches toward compensation. Three regional land laws appear to have adopted a narrow interpretation of the term 'public purpose' while one regional land law uses the term 'actual compensation'; preexpropriation public hearing is required in another regional land law. 50 Thus, in spite of an apparent upward delegation by regional states of their power to pass expropriation laws to the Federal Government, regions still tend to assert some legislative power over expropriation. There is lack of uniformity in the rules as well. One manifestation of absence of uniformity in the rules is "Lack of standardized valuation and compensation methods and procedures [which is] causing different valuations by different land taking agencies, resulting in different compensation values for similar lands".
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Expropriation laws of Ethiopia are meant to apply uniformly across the country without factoring in the specific notion of property that prevails in the pastoral areas. The definition of property in terms of things attached to the land which is a product of labor and/or capital implies the rejection of customary land rights.
There is a differentiated treatment between investors and other persons in relation to public purpose and compensation. This emanates from bilateral investment treaties Ethiopia signed with 29 countries as of the end of June 2012.
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The bilateral investment treaties have become incompatible with the Expropriation Proclamation as the former (as opposed to the latter) embody market value approach to compensation in the tradition of liberal property rights notion which is promoted by developed nations in the international arena.
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The treaties also appear to envisage a broad right to judicial review. For example, the bilateral investment treaty Ethiopia has signed with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland requires payment of, "prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Such compensation shall amount to the market value of the investment expropriated…" 55 In terms of recourse to the courts, it provides "The national or company affected shall have a right … to prompt review, by a judicial or other independent authority of that Party, of his or its case and of the valuation of his or its investment …". 56 Therefore, a joint reading of the Expropriation Proclamation and the BITs implies three hierarchies. These are investors protected under BITs, investors without BITs and other persons. The most legislative protection is given to those investors who come from a home country which has signed a BIT with Ethiopia.
e) A landholder:
The law addresses the issue of who might be entitled to receive compensation in such a manner that would exclude certain individuals who could rightly be 52 regarded as enjoying property interest in land subject to expropriation. Under Article 5(2) and Article 13(1) of the Expropriation Proclamation, compensation shall be paid to "holders of expropriated land." It defines a holder in Article 2(3) as "an individual … [who] has lawful possession over the land to be expropriated…" The concept of landholder is further amplified by subsequent laws defining it to mean he/she who produces ''proof of legitimate possession of the expropriated landholding…".
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By incorporating an individualistic notion of landholding, this formulation of the law excludes secondary land users from demanding compensation. The restrictive appreciation of the term landholder leaves out millions of individuals in peri-urban areas that obtain land informally to provide themselves with a shelter. The law should in principle 58 be formulated broadly along the line of the Code, that is, in such a manner that any person who establishes the existence of a property right in their favor over the land expropriated is given the opportunity to demand compensation.
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In relation to the effect of gaps in inclusiveness, it is observed that:
… the use of the power of eminent domain is depriving people not recognized as owners of the land of their means of subsistence. Tenants, herders, and agricultural laborers are among those paying the highest social cost of expropriation because they are not recognized as holding any property rights.
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Ethiopia's legal regime can benefit from the experience in Kenya whose law of compulsory land acquisition provides leeway to compensate occupants in good faith including customary land rights holders that may not hold title to the land. …regional agencies, mainly municipalities that are zoning large expanses of land … are facing cash flow problems. While they are evicting farmers … they have to pay compensation immediately, [but] they will be leasing the land and receive fees in the future. There is no bridging finance available … This is leading to undervaluing … land and property to match the available funds which are unfair to those losing their lands and have to establish new livelihoods …
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As an informant states: Local government officials pressurize those who demand compensation before handing over the land by saying land belongs to the state and such demand is not proper. If they do not budge, they are likely to be tagged as 'obstructer of development or anti-development element.' The designation can entail locking them up in prison. Local governments tend to carry out projects such as health clinics and schools which require land expropriation without any budget for compensation.
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And it was said, In case where expropriation is carried out for federal projects, compensation is paid if there is a total taking; but due to corruption, the amount of compensation paid to the person whose land is taken is low because evaluators and local officials take a good amount of it. The state pays it but the money goes to the wrong pocket. The state even complains about payment of exorbitant compensation which discourages the initiation of new projects.
Paltry compensation also arises from lack of implementation of the valuation aspects of the Expropriation Proclamation. Even if "…the law says that the property valuation shall be made by private experts and that in the meantime by a committee … there are no expert valuators or institutions that give license to expert valuators. Thus, valuation of property continues to be made by committees". transferred to the Ministry of Works and Urban Development, which became the Ministry of Urban Development and Construction, the Ministry of Urban Development, Housing and Construction (and at present, the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing). 65 The transfer appeared to have occurred even before the former commenced implementation. Frequent power transfers make it difficult to clearly identify the public authority in charge of ensuring the implementation of the provisions of the Expropriation Proclamation including issues of expert valuations.
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There is also an outright breach of a clear rule in the process of expropriation as exhibited by cases where compensations are paid well after dispossession in violation of the clear constitutional right that forbids dispossession before compensation. 67 An informant had recalled the following: My farmland was taken by the local government administration to build a school. I had permanent crops such as enset [aka false banana] on the land. I was allowed to prematurely consume such crops as they were constructing the school. They promised me a substitute land. They did not give it to me yet. Nor did they pay me compensation. Now I have vacated the land. It has been two years since they took possession of my land. I repeatedly went to the administration pleading for compensation and a substitute land. It seems to me that there is no hope of getting it.
g) Rehabilitation:
The compensation approach alone is inadequate to restore the livelihood of those affected by expropriation even where compensation is adequate. To this end, there is a law which provides that local authorities undertaking expropriation shall, to the extent possible, rehabilitate the expropriated in addition to the payment of compensation for property on the land and displacement compensation.
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The following illustrates the need for rehabilitation toward new livelihoods in addition to compensation: 65 The Expropriation Proclamation and Article 36 (7) Daniel captured the situation fittingly by indicating the gaps in the clarity of the law regarding the duty of the government toward the resettlement and rehabilitation of evicted smallholder farmers: …the requirement of resettlement and rehabilitation program during expropriation event lacks clarity. Apart from a confusing provision in the Constitution, there is no specific legal basis nor a systematic policy and measures in place for resettlement of displaced farmers. In other words, whether the government is required to resettle and provide rehabilitative assistance to those people who are displaced as a result of expropriation procedure is not clear.
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Assisting expropriated peasants to start generating regular income from nonfarming sources would be more sensible where the state could not provide them with "a substitute land which can easily be ploughed and generate income".
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Even though the option of substitute land is favored equally both by the expropriator and the expropriated, it is becoming difficult, if not impossible, in peri-urban areas where land is scarce. Thus, the concept of rehabilitation suggests helping the expropriated resume their normal farming life or helping them change their calling entirely where a substitute farmland is unavailable. But the notion of rehabilitation is not elaborated in the law, and the nature of the rehabilitation strategy is not clarified. Nor is the source of the rehabilitation fund indicated. 73 The practice is inconsistent. Whereas in projects that are supported by the World Bank, the state and private investors are trying to carry out resettlement and rehabilitation programs, in most other cases, there are no such practices performed either by a public or private operators. Only in selected huge public projects does the state try to give resettlement and rehabilitation assistances. This creates a 70 Solomon Bekure et al (2006) , supra note 62. 71 Daniel W/Gebriel infra note 138, p. 187. 72 The Expropriation Proclamation, Article 8 (3). 73 The Regulations, the Preamble and the Expropriation Proclamation, Article 13(1); see also
May 2005 Deliberations note 6, pp. 8-10.
double treatment of displaced people in the absence of clear and comprehensive guidelines as to when and how this should be provided. The result of this disregard leaves farmers untended with all the cash money in their hands and unwise decisions in their 'minds'. This eventually leads to a spendthrift behavior of the farmers which made them end up in poverty.
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As another study suggests, absence of principled rehabilitation program is not just extravagant spending of monetary compensation award. It is also about imprudent investment, for instance, in the form of depositing money in bank and thus exposing it to the vagaries of inflation. Harris says, in addition to increasing their consumption expenditure, …by far the biggest and most striking result is that most of the compensation payment is left in the bank…With the exception of a few households that made very large investments, most households have done very little with their money.… Land in Ethiopia also serves as more than just a productive asset: it serves as insurance and security in old age when it is used for sharecropping. Compensation payments should assist households in making the transition from small-scale agriculture to other income generating activity and yet, in this short time period, it seems that the majority of households are not able to do so.
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There is thus the need for a policy and legal measures which underline that "people affected by development projects should be able to improve, or at least be well-off after the project as without the project".
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In this respect, there is a need to introduce the concept of social impact assessment, which would require projects to be preceded an assessment aimed at "analyzing, monitoring and managing the intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions and any social changes brought about by those interventions".
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If we take the experience of India as an example, it is recognized at policy level that "traumatic, psychological and socio-cultural consequences on the displaced populations … call for affirmative state action for protecting their rights and the need for active participation of affected persons". This is on the top of payment of the market value of the land to the affected people. The Indian draft land acquisitions bill construes people affected by land acquisition broadly to include those working on the land who are taken as tenants. Ethiopia can also emulate from Ghana where the 1992 Constitution of that country in Article 20(3), provides for resettlement of "displaced inhabitants on suitable alternative land with due regard for their economic well-being and social and cultural values". 80 The Indian and Ghanaian approach to land acquisition is lacking in Ethiopia. As indicated above, Ethiopia needs to work out the details of the notion of rehabilitation of evictees which is vaguely mentioned in the law. In the context of farmers who lose their lands for urban expansion purposes, this rehabilitation scheme might, for instance, mean putting an alternative livelihood framework "to integrate them into the urban economy and society…" by offering them with "Access to credits and savings opportunities" and giving them the requisite training in alternative livelihood strategies tailored to their specific local circumstances.
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Whatever mode of rehabilitation strategy may be adopted in Ethiopia, it is imperative that the country move away from the mere compensatory approach it is pursuing at present. 
Procedural safeguards
Procedural safeguards with regard to expropriation suggests observance of due process of law whose absence has been equated with "…being deprived of land rights or lacking access to legal remedy to defend them" which constitutes "the ultimate state of vulnerability…".
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Proper and effective procedural safeguards are believed to contribute to the protection of property rights for they have a restraining effect both on the executive and the legislature.
However, the expropriation law in force in Ethiopia manifests a deficiency in this regard. The Constitution, in its draft stage, included a clause providing for a public forum at which the concerned public authorities would be required to 79 The Draft Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, Foreword I, July 2011, at <www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/.../The_Draft_National__738172a.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2012). Interestingly this bill also seeks to absolutely prohibit acquisition of "multi-cropped, irrigated land" for non-agricultural uses; and it also provides that the land would be taken away from the developer if he fails to use it for the intended purpose for five years. 80 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992 prove that expropriation was the only available option under the circumstances. The draft also required the authorities to establish a genuine case of public interest and compelled them to give an opportunity for potential land losers to explain their own version of the intended project. 84 However, this was removed from the final version of the Constitution. Thus, as the law stands, the requirement of public consultation is absent; it shows a regression in this regard from the Code which in early 1960s required the authorities to organize a public inquiry under certain conditions. 85 Under the Expropriation Proclamation, expropriation is crafted largely as a matter that involves reaching a decision by an executive organ followed by simple notification of such decision to the expropriated. The process requires going through a series of administrative decisions. Some of these include reaching a decision on public purpose, determining whether the land has been lawfully acquired, fixing compensation and notifying the expropriated the time within which the land has to be cleared and taking over the land.
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Among these, matters of compensation can be contested in the regular courts by way of review.
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The expropriated cannot contest certain aspects of decisions of the authorities be it in an administrative or in judicial forum. This is true, for instance regarding the need for a specific project or whether the project advances public interest. This also holds true in connection with legality of the land possession and the appropriateness of the timing of dispossession. These issues appear to be left entirely to the discretion of the authority undertaking the expropriation. In such matters the administration reigns unchecked. The Expropriation Proclamation`s exclusion of vital matters from the purview of regular courts relies on the Code`s tradition of confining the power of regular courts to compensation issues. It has been remarked, "Looking into the Ethiopian procedure reveals the conspicuous absence of courts in the process. The involvement of courts in the process is minimal in that most cases do not even reach the courts". coming to court where they want to raise legal issues not related to compensation. Affected persons are required to adduce evidence showing that they have handed over the property to the authorities as a condition for appeal in regular courts; but many petitioners do not meet this requirement because they do not know this requirement of the law. As a result, those affected by expropriation file cases to the regular court before handing their land over to the authorities. We are constrained by the law. We reject their case telling them that the law does not allow them to go to the court to challenge expropriation before they hand over the property in question to the authorities. It narrows judicial remedies.
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A property law expert also says "Courts should be empowered in regard to property. Their involvement shall be enhanced. Property disputes which do not entail the involvement of courts shall be reduced. Currently, power in regard to expropriation … gravitates towards the administration". 90 It has further been stated:
Property is insecure. The Constitution says people have full private ownership over property attributed to their capital and labor. But authorities change directives regarding land and immovable property frequently. The law says [landholders] shall be given 90 days to clear their property after receiving expropriation order. But occasionally [they] are ordered to remove their property in less than 90 days. The authorities in charge of land matters possess wide discretionary power. They can revoke land certificates without judicial scrutiny and they can do so easily. There shall be laws which allow review of decisions of administrative authorities in regard to revocation of land certificates.
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The Expropriation Proclamation, therefore, appears to imply that the expropriated cannot challenge the decision of administrative bodies regarding the existence of public purpose, be it in administrative or judicial forum. The law conveys this message by restricting appeals to matters pertaining to the denial or amount of compensation.
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The law seems to take the decision of the concerned executive authority on the existence or otherwise of public purpose in a given project as a final one. And in making the issue of determination of public purpose non-justiciable, the Expropriation Proclamation has followed the path taken by the Code. 93 89 Summary of Focus Group Discussion supra note 13. 90 Interview supra note 32. 91 Summary of Focus Group Discussion supra note 13. 92 The Expropriation Proclamation, Article 11. 93 The Code, Articles 1473-1479. …[A]ll property owners in Ethiopia, especially those who live in the city center and the verge of it are under perpetual threat of expropriation. Even those land holders in transition zone (between center and periphery) are, in principle, under the risk of losing their land, because someone with better economic means may claim their land for "better use" of it. The role of courts in interpretation and restricting the administrative decision of public purpose is not known. The silence of the law may be interpreted in some quarters and by some courts as if courts are denied such power. In current Ethiopia where the independence of courts is not encouraging, the tendency will be that they may not 'dare' to restrict the government from its decision of expropriation.
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Kenya and Ghana are better than Ethiopia in empowering courts to review a wide range of expropriation issues. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of Kenya states that compulsory acquisition of property by the State shall "only be made under a law which makes provision for a right of access to the High Court by any person who has an interest in or right over the property whether direct or on appeal from any other authority, for the determination of his interest or right and the amount of compensation to which he is entitled". This constitutional requirement has been elaborated in Kenya`s Land Acquisition Act. 95 Likewise, Ghana possesses a relatively similar normative framework. Yet, both countries face practical drawbacks. This means one should be able to see the practice under the veneer of robust legal stipulations. A review of Kenya`s law of compulsory land acquisition shows that sufficient guidance is included at the level of the Constitution, stipulating for prompt and fair compensation; providing leeway to compensate occupants in good faith who may not hold title to the land and land administration, and hence decentralization of expropriation to county level. 96 The problems in the implementation of the law of compulsory acquisition of land rights in Ghana are summarized as follows:
… [The problems include] the acquisition of lands far in excess of actual requirements, unpaid compensation in respect of some of the acquisitions, change of use of compulsorily acquired land as against the purpose of the acquisition, lands occupied by the state without any acquisition, depriving the land owners the opportunity to demand compensation. The result is loss of public confidence in the state machinery for the management of land, leading to tension between the state and customary land owners, massive deliberate encroachment of state lands, and challenging the state's legitimacy to claim control over compulsorily acquired lands. 97 Inadequate compensation, failure to take the value of land into account during compensation, narrow interpretation of the term 'landholder or landowner' in a way that excludes some legitimate property right holders and lack of representation of affected persons in the process of determination of compensation are issues of concern in Ghana`s expropriation regime. 98 Hence, the lesson that can be taken from the eminent domain laws and practice of the two countries is that even fairly elaborate constitutional provisions supported by long established subsidiary expropriation laws could lead to a wide interpretation of public purpose, a paltry compensation and frequent violation of legal procedures. These lessons show that the problems do not merely relate to the embodiment of the rights in the law, but also pertain to their justiciability and access to courts in order to prevent arbitrary or corrupt official behaviors.
Government Narrative: 'Transformative Expropriation'
The discussion and analysis here-above imply a loose expropriation legal framework that tilts towards the state. This lopsided expropriation legal arrangement is reflected in the construction of public purpose, the removal of land use rights from compensable items, payment of insignificant amount of compensation, and above all, making virtually all administrative decisions pertaining to expropriation immune from judicial review. As a result, checks and balances have been removed. It has cleared the road for the government to transfer land to the private sector with few shackles.
Once the land expropriated from peasants is transferred to investors, legally speaking, it becomes harder for the state to expropriate such land from the latter.
This comes from its own legislative commitments as embodied in bilateral investment treaties and the Expropriation Proclamation. The land use rights of peasants, after it is transferred to the investor through the instrumentality of eminent domain, becomes part of the domain of more secure long term lease right. This seems to be a bid to offer the necessary legal security to the property of investors in a country that is trying to change its previous anti-private property impulse.
This in turn is meant to attract more investments leading to the creation of more tax revenues, more and secure jobs, acceleration and increase in the volume of capital inflow and transfer of technology and ultimately bringing about economic development. As one of the poorest countries, Ethiopia puts a premium on economic growth and consequently aspires to raise the income level of its poverty-stricken population. With this in mind, the state decidedly favors the transfer of land from peasants to investors through takings. In so doing, the state aspires to fundamentally alter the existing structure of the Ethiopian economy, which is dominated by subsistence agriculture where land is held in the hands of the majority.
The state thinks that such land tenure transforming mandate comes from the idea that land is the 'common property' in the sense that every Ethiopian has an indivisible ownership claim over every piece of land located within the bounds of the Ethiopian territory. 99 Yet, each Ethiopian citizen may not necessarily realize this ownership right in the sense of being entitled to a share in every plot of land. The state seems to believe that it is incumbent upon it, as a holder and manger of this common resource in the form of trusteeship, to ensure that all citizens would at least indirectly benefit from the use of such common asset.
This line of analysis views expropriation as a beneficial measure in the sense that land would be taken from the multitude who are using it for subsistence purposes and be transferred to investors who are supposed to invest on it to benefit the majority through the creation of jobs and the development of economic and social infrastructure. In this policy context, land would be given swiftly and cheaply to what the state calls limatawi balehabt ('developmental investors') and such developmental investors in return are required to use the land so given for the intended project within the agreed time-frame. Failing this would entail, land retaking and monetary sanctions. This seems to be a sound rendition of expropriation in the context of the state`s economic policy which is anchored on the idea of rapid 'inclusive economic growth'. This vision of land expropriation will not, however, bear these anticipated fruits automatically.
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Its fruitfulness is rather contingent upon the monitoring and follow-up capacity of the state authorities, the integrity of the process of land expropriation, the officials in charge as well as the soundness of investment projects. It also rests on the willingness of officials to take effective measure against those investors who take land for speculative purposes. The vision of transformative land takings also hinges on the capacity of investors to put the land they take to use for productive activities.
Nevertheless, empirical studies suggest that expropriated lands are often taken for speculative purposes, or the purposes for which projects are approved are unilaterally changed; researches also indicate lack of consistent and effective sanctions against those investors who leave such land unused for several years.
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These failings have readily and frequently been admitted by the authorities themselves.
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At the heart of this beneficial expropriation in Ethiopia is an increasing trend for redefining the notion of property rights in land. The country is retaking land that was expropriated from landlords and redistributed to peasants after the 1974 revolution. In 1975, it took the issuance of a single legislation to wipe out the system of exploitative absentee landlordism and to transfer land to poor tenants and farm workers in the Ethiopian countryside. Now it might take a series of acts of expropriation to undermine the effects of such redistributive action. The state that sided with poor peasants is now tending to ally with capital on the assumption that such an alliance would advance the interests of the general public. Finally, at the heart of the beneficial expropriation thinking is an economic notion of land rights, i.e., "an ethic that regards economic development and monetary return as evidence of the land's highest and best use". 104 In other words, the scheme of beneficial expropriation of land upheld by the Ethiopian state is conceived as simply one of the factors of production that changes hands through the intermediary of the state from peasants to investors in order to advance economic development.
Reforming Expropriation in Ethiopia
The preceding sections reveal a lax expropriation regime. Based on this finding, the sections imply reform concerning compensable interests, basis of calculating compensation, substitute land, normative contradiction and uniformity, notion of a landholder and significant implementation problems including lack of rehabilitation scheme. The current section considers the potential of rethinking the country`s expropriation law through enhanced judicial security, recasting land use rights as a human right and ensuring quality of post-taking projects.
Judicial scrutiny
Scholars have sought to rectify the imbalance attributable to the present expropriation laws of Ethiopia by allowing the judiciary to entertain major disputes relating to expropriation including public purpose. 105 Unfortunately, the law regarding the role of courts is vague because the law neither allows nor prohibits court litigation on the question of public purpose. Moreover, the legal framework on the possibility of reviewing final decisions of lower courts in relation to compensation through cassation is silent. In this regard, it is opined that "The law does not explicitly permit cassation. It is not proscribed either. Hence, parties have the right to seek review by way of cassation".
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The dictum 'what is not prohibited is assumed to be allowed' can also be invoked in connection with public purpose. The access to justice clause enshrined in Article 37 of the Constitution might be construed to this end. This is a mere argument with the possibility of a counter-argument.
In the Ethiopian case, allowing people affected by expropriation to resort to regular courts might not necessarily work in favor of the poor because of deficit in the independence of the judiciary in relation to cases that are deemed or perceived to matter to the authorities. Currently, the country`s judicial system has moved away from its earlier formal dependence towards its legal and constitutional independence. This is so because the judiciary`s formal independence is unambiguously stated in the Constitution, which declares that: "An independent judiciary is established… Courts of any level shall be free from any interference of … any governmental body, government official or from any other source … judges shall be directed solely by the law." 107 There are misgivings about the judiciary`s detachment, as a matter of fact, from the legacy of dependence. History is one factor. In Ethiopia, historically, there had been a formal union between the judiciary and the executive adversely affecting the former`s present independence. Assefa observes: 108 In historic Ethiopia, adjudication of cases formed part and parcel of public administration. One finds a merger of functions within the executive, the administration of justice and the executive function proper…This blend of judicial and executive functions in the latter is not without implications. First and foremost, the judiciary never had a separate existence of its own as an institution. It was subject to all kinds of pressures from the other branches.
The deference of the judiciary to executive measures is another factor. This is manifested, for example, in the decision of the Federal Supreme Court which has prohibited courts from reviewing decisions regarding nullifications of title deeds by administrative bodies. 118 Therefore, given the above accounts of the judiciary`s present standing and historical inertia behind it, it is unclear to expect this branch of the government would scrutinize expropriation issues such as determination of public purpose and rehabilitation should they be challenged before it.
Redefining land use rights as human rights
Some rightly classify expropriation into two categories on the basis of the link between property (subjected to expropriation) and one`s livelihood. 119 The contrast between the categories represents expropriation of a mere economic asset versus that of a subsistence asset. When land is taken from investors, the government is depriving them of a mere asset, but not the foundation of their livelihood; when property such as land is taken from small landholders the government is depriving them of a livelihood asset. 120 Subscribing to this dichotomy calls for more stringent protection when expropriation is invoked with regard to livelihood asset than when it is used to expropriate an economic asset. However, what is reflected in the expropriation law of Ethiopia is the opposite; in the country`s eagerness to attract investment, it seems, it is making it legally easier for the state to deprive a livelihood asset than is the case with a mere economic asset. There is thus the need to depart from this status quo by creating a nexus between livelihood resources such as land and the right to life (as land rights of smallholder farmers are indispensable for the right to life). Section 1.2(g) has already implied this linkage when it proposed the mandatory rehabilitation strategy, i.e., tying land use rights to loss of land, a critical livelihood asset, which in effect means linking such right to the wider concerns of livelihood. Within the scheme of the Constitution, land rights and more generally the right to property are, however, labeled as democratic rights as opposed to a human right. Though argued to be "a classification without significant impact", 121 the categorization of land rights as democratic rights formally means, in essence 122 the state can more easily restrict or trump the land rights of citizens. If the democratic rights path is followed, the state can issue lax expropriation laws, as it has done at present, that mandate it to take land from the people in the name of development.
One can nevertheless plausibly interpret other provisions of the Constitution to take land rights out of the democratic rights box. Following the foot path of the Indian courts, 123 though rendered in connection with public employment, it is plausible to link the land rights of peasants to the right to life clause of the Constitution, which is seen as "emanating from the nature of mankind" and "inviolable". 124 Land rights in Ethiopia are (more often than not) the sole source of livelihood for smallholder farmers. They constitute an indispensable factor for the rural population and are thus part and parcel of their constitutional right to life; this would accord such rights sanctity by removing them away from easy reach of state authorities. 125 Characterization of land rights as a dimension of the right to life suggested here is not the same as the human rights approach advanced by the UN agencies with regard to evictions. This discourse of the UN agencies articulates evictions within the rubric of social, economic and cultural rights of affected people in particular their housing right -primarily in urban settings. The human rights approach as advanced by the UN agencies rejects any eviction projects, and hence housing rights as human rights trumps all other societal concerns. Here property right as a type of human right underlies the housing rights campaigners. 126 This way of presenting human rights has been rightly critiqued as failing "…to acknowledge the economic implications of policy options." 127 Land as an aspect of the constitutional right of peasants proposed here is also in a sharp contrast with the economic development perspective, an approach formulated by international economic agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and USAID that would, if applied in the context of present Ethiopian land tenure, over privilege the objective of economic development. At the heart of this latter position is economic utilitarianism grounded in private property rights ideas of Boserup and North. 128 A concrete application of this economic development discourse is encapsulated in free trade agreements where the paramount issue is the protection of the property rights of investors underpinned by the belief that opportunities created by the investors would trickle down to the poor. 129 The economic development discourse seems to incline toward efficiency for it welcomes transfer of land from `less efficient` users, peasants, to more efficient users, investors, as long as the former get 'just compensation'. But it is argued that: "Economic development theories that inspire land tenure reforms in many countries ignore the human rights dimension; free trade agreements focus on the interests of investors. If land policies are to be based on solid foundations, all these dimensions must be considered". 130 On the other hand, the argument that treats land rights of peasants in Ethiopia as an aspect of their constitutional right to life seeks to combine the merits of the human rights and the economic development approaches while removing their deficiencies. To this end, it corrects the imbalance in land takings that at present tilts toward the authorities without at the same time making it impossible for the authorities to use their eminent domain power.
In sum, the presentation of land rights of peasants as an integral part of their constitutional right to life is not sufficient in itself. It requires concrete expression in legal rules, as has been recommended in the context of Indian draft land acquisition bill discussed above. The draft is meant to restrict the state in the course of land expropriation. It tightens up the definition of public purpose, puts in place mandatory and effective public hearing and consultation mechanisms, allows interested persons to object to land acquisition, thereby "limiting the type and amount of agricultural land that can be expropriated at any given point in time," 131 making the amount of compensation adequate, and revising the expropriation laws so that loss of land of the poor occurs only upon the fulfilment stringent conditions. In effect, payment of compensation does not merely consider loss of property on the land such as standing corps. These and other specific legal remedies have also been suggested to revamp expropriation laws of other countries. 
Post-expropriation development
The fact that farmland is expropriated for economic development from people who use it for subsistence purpose may not always mean that judicious development will occur. As the authorities in Ethiopia readily and frequently admit, expropriated lands lay idle for lack of the requisite capital and/or for want of proper follow up. 133 As Girma notes: The authorities expropriate land from farmers under the guise of advancing more important purposes… Many `investors` take the land not to invest but to sell it underground with high price… Others change the original purpose for which land was expropriated. And most rural land… stays idle…. Public authorities are not ready to take any measure against those who fail to develop the land within the agreed time. ... 134 In other situations, the land expropriated might be put to inimical development activities such as the ones that ruin the environment. Or, development might take place to the sole benefit of investors without addressing the felt need of society such as secure employment. 135 In the context where land is acquired for speculative purposes or put to inimical use, it is necessary to give special attention to the quality of development during pre-expropriation public hearings and consultations. Quality post-expropriation development means ascertaining at the time of expropriation the probability of the occurrence of development which contributes to the reduction of "concentrated poverty." Dana argues:
If we want eminent domain … for good development, we should consider eminent domain reform that ties the availability of eminent domain to the characteristics of the development that will replace current land uses. One such reform would be an eminent domain test that would make eminent domain available when the anticipated new development would have features that are likely to contribute to reductions in the concentration of poverty. Such reductions arguably are a social good in themselves. 136 Broadly speaking, each project requiring land expropriation has to raise and prudently answer the question: "…what kinds of development and what kinds of communities, we as a society, state and national polities, believe will best advance the public welfare."? 137 This requires giving as much attention to the nature of development to take place after expropriation as we do pay attention to the amount of compensation due and the judicial processes at the disposal of affected people. public inertest … The power of eminent domain must be viewed positively and even the most broadly worded public purpose limitation encourages a negative, restrictive approach. Moreover, if the definition is expanded to include any conceivable project, the limitation is being simply retained for ornamental or sentimental reasons and is misleading. 140 Dunning characterized the concept of public purpose as 'alien or obsolete legal doctrines inhibiting development' in African countries. 141 He argued that the requirement of payment of compensation should however be retained but linked directly to development, for example, by "denying compensation for undeveloped property…" 142 He further suggested simplified procedures in order to expedite the taking of property by the state at an early stage in the process. 143 Under Dunning`s schema the state would be allowed to exercise its eminent domain power unshackled by conditions. In his scheme, the costs of economic development projects would be cheaper and the implementation of the projects in poor African countries swifter; the land so taken would be put to economic development conceived in its broader sense; people would benefit from the jobs created by the developmental state by raising their level of income; and perhaps, the state would exercise its power of eminent domain judiciously in spite of lack of legal constraints.
However, the idea of unhindered expropriation was advanced at the time when development was equated with economic growth through a robust state, which assumes that if the nation grows, then there is development. Experience has taught mankind to the contrary. Eminent domain has been exercised in the name of development to dis-empower the poor. The view which would like to see lax expropriation requirements appears to interpret land rights merely in economic terms to be compensated directly with the payment of lower amount of compensation and indirectly through the creation of jobs and availability of infrastructure. Yet, it has been amply settled in land tenure literature that to the poor, land is worth more than an economic asset; land gives them a place in a community. It is a means through which they voice their concerns in a given locality. Expropriation, when invoked inappropriately, detaches the poor from that locality.
One can easily subscribe to Dunning`s suggestion that speed, simplicity and fairness ought to mark a system of good eminent domain. 144 for the removal of key restraints against the state`s expropriation power unjustifiably favors the efficiency side of the matter at the expense of justice and fairness. One could not agree more with Sue Farran`s observation that:
… often economic development is taking place so rapidly that the victims of it are left behind and long-term consequences are conveniently ignored in favor of short-term gain. Moreover, inequalities of wealth combined with inequalities of political power can result in a self-perpetuating system of human rights denial, especially where those who most benefit seek to preserve the unequal status quo.
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To argue for controlling the power of the executive by subjecting it to political and legal processes in its exercise of the power of expropriation is not to argue for paralyzing the state. It is rather to argue for subjecting the state to the rule of law.
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It is about a quest for balance between private and public stakes in the exercise of the power of expropriation. At stake in expropriation proceedings that do not maintain this balance are the loss of livelihoods, erosion of the rule of law and adversities in the stability of the country.
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